Capacity Building of Indigenous Forces in Afghanistan by Western Forces Post 2012
Introduction
Building capacity for indigenous security forces presents serious challenges in most cases based on the political as well as cultural obstructions, but it is even worse during active battles. Western forces such as the United States forces have always played a significant part in building foreign forces in the quest of boosting international security in the most vulnerable regions such as Iraq and Afghanistan[1]. Forces capacity building is not just an act of increasing their number, training, equipment and releasing them to fight rather it is more of focusing on the ability to enhance their confidence and abilities to offer protection to the people[2]. Forces capacity building demands competent leadership and consistency. Forces capacity building remain to be one of the most prioritized activities adopted by several nations in order to ensure stability, security, and peace in vulnerable countries such as Afghanistan[3]. While most countries are required to fight radicalism within their individual jurisdictions most of them lack the needed capacity to accomplish the goal, the element of forces capacity building incorporates collaborating with powerful partners in terms of resources and skills to training indigenous forces to equip them with the needed skills to stop terrorism and violence. This report will seek to discuss the capacity building of indigenous forces focusing on the case study of Afghanistan post-2012 and how the ongoing development and capacity needs across organizational structure are being addressed. The study will begin by synthesis literature related to capacity building of indigenous forces in vulnerable countries such as Afghanistan. The report proceeds as follows. In the first section an introduction to the issue, with a description followed by a review of literature with respect to leadership competence, leadership needs, change of skills in organizational hierarchy and influence of leadership. Lastly, a synthesis of literature with a case study of Afghanistan indigenous forces will be conducted. The conclusion will provide a detailed analysis of the identified challenges and the proposed solutions.
Counterinsurgency thinkers and security operations experts believe that creating skilled indigenous police forces is an unconditional imperative in regard to creating stability in fragile countries such as Afghanistan and Iraq. Yet, organizational leadership and structures among the western forces that are accountable for the roles such as the American government in frequent cases appear to be glorification the principle of breaks. Actually, western forces have demonstrated their commitment to creating stability in Afghanistan post-2012 but lacks the capability to efficiently train and expand what is debatably the essential aspects of the nation’s interior security forces. The existing gap was clearly demonstrated by the United States involvement with police force building in more than a decade of its interventions in Afghanistan and Iraq respectively which is accounted for significant outcomes in both countries. Based on the increasing terrorist threat and the domination of the terror groups in different regions across the globe which has in turn affected the general ability of the affected countries to grow politically and socio-economically, the efforts by the western forces makes it evident that the building of effective indigenous forces is an important operation to subject it to uncoordinated and uncomprehensive measures in the field.
In Afghanistan, the instant post-war surrounding was branded by disorder and absence of healthy indigenous internal security[4]. However, for the case of Afghanistan although for different rationales police building lacked adequate attention either in regard to planning prior to the occurrence of war or post-2012 after the invasion era of the conflict. Given that the war that had taken place for close two double decades had mainly resulted in major destructions of the Afghanistan infrastructure, the western forces and the United Nations opted on the use of a light foot approach that restrained the global involvement in internal security affairs in Afghanistan. In consequence, over the past few years past the war, local policing roles were assumed by private soldiers that worked at the command of regional authorities rather than based on the request and authority of the central government. When it became rather evident that the immediate strategy was unsustainable, the primary donors particularly those from the west that were mainly involved in assisting the Afghanistan administration settled on the adoption of lead national strategy that wrapped out the leadership of the different security sector’s reform aspect to distinct nations as for instance German was left to bear the responsibility of capacity building of the local Afghan police forces.
Leadership has played a substantial influence in regard to how the capacity building need and organization issues are being dealt with. To begin with, in the lead up to the post-war intervention, most of the senior officials from the western nations and forces focused on giving inadequate attention to the necessity for police force building but on the ground of a distinct reason[5]. In that, there is the assumption that Afghanistan apparatus and forces would remain intact. Since the western leadership believed and anticipated that the allied forces would be accommodated as liberators, the assumption that an obliging Afghanistan military and police forces held the ability to maintain national and regional security. This notion has however been proved as inaccurate. Post the war, the destruction that had occurred meant that the coalition was exceptionally not equipped in dealing with the extensive failure of national order that had occurred prior thus melting away the country’s indigenous forces as the western forces such as the U.S military assumed to have acted enough[6]. In Afghanistan immediately after the war rather than having a functioning and intact coalition, it was established that the forces were just crumbling giants.
Forces capacity building in Afghanistan has been faced by a number of challenges mainly because of the needs resources, effort, the absence of security, insufficiency of forces, low quality of police training and instructions and the inability to manage efforts gathered from different nations. The rather unstable leadership has resulted in indigenous forces acquiring training under the corrupt and incompetent leaders which have thus restrained the ability of the forces. Afghanistan has a populace that is over 30 million with forces accounting for about a hundred and fifty thousand[7]. The ratio is not a balanced one which makes the operations hard to achieve. Prior to 2012, the western forces had not been involved in capacity building of such large forces which in turn complicated the interventions.
From its foundation, the Afghanistan indigenous defense and security forces have widely been known for their intense experiences derived from the ever-changing partisan and security setting which have in turn affected their sizes, organizations, and capacity[8]. The forces have for the longest period being under the dependence of the western support for both monetary and operational help. Even though the intention to grow and enhance the capacity of this forces has been a primary priority of the western countries and the international community such as the United States it is evident that the forces are most likely to live under the dependency for a longer period than it had been anticipated post-2012. Despite the fact that the national security and defense forces in Afghanistan are characterized by desirable designs, the command and monitoring systems fail to perform as needed[9]. In that, the system is heavily reliant on bureaucracy which thus weakens the uppermost power and the lower one as well. The political meddling and the dodging of the official command chain normally hinders the interventions for capacity building from conducting well-established processes and plans in general.
Evidently, the lack of coordination is mainly attributed to the leadership which is a major threat to the capacity building[10]. With the fact that decisions within the structures have to be developed in a rather shared structure has resulted in major delays in regard to making appointments within the forces organizational command chain thus hindering the capability of the indigenous forces as well as their capability to fully assert command as well as control. it is worth acknowledging that capacity building of the indigenous forces is not just a matter of providing the needed resources to offer adequate defense and guarantee security but also seeking to provide practical training and resolving the organizational and structures issues that alter the ability of the forces to fulfill the set obligations[11].
In regard to capacity building, management remains to be one of the essential human operation based on its practicability on aligning processes. In the military forces, management plays part in the harmonization of efforts. This is because the effectiveness of the defense forces is fully dependent on grouped based efforts an operation that is characterized by complexity despite its growing importance. Leadership can best be described as the procedure through which individuals behaviors to work in a willing nature are influenced while seeking to maintain enthusiasm in the quest of achieving the set objectives[12]. The obligations of all leaders are to ensure that they increase the main ambitions of the followers. The existing assumptions and paradigms regarding the command, leadership, and management in the case of indigenous forces development in Afghanistan needs to be characterized mainly by a transformational leadership theory.
The bureaucratic leadership theory is assumed to be the most effective approach within the military command chain based on its ability to ensure corporation. However, this paradigm is not effective on the ground that it only calls for a corporation it fails to acknowledge the general need for collaboration and shared motives. It is widely known that collaboration and teamwork are the primary determinants of success in the contemporary organizations particularly in the military forces where the effort of every member matters[13]. Transformational leadership theory can best be described as the leadership strategy that leads to individual and social structures changes. The idea of the theory is that it seeks to create transformation both for the individuals involved as well as the leaders themselves thus making the ability to achieve certain goals more viable. The most influential is the one that allows individuals to work collaboratively to achieve set goals. Effective leadership in today’s command and military environments are essential in allowing individuals growth and the sustaining of the most quality performances in general.
Transforming leadership holds an inspiring impact on the leaders, the organization’s performance and those being led on the ground that it elevates the rate of individual’s behavior and interactions. Ultimately, this theory is more of a moral practice because leaders ensure that the followers are fully involved based on the existence of shared motives, values as well as objectives. It is asserted by Hayes, that it is only those that are being led that can fully describe their actual needs and this mainly implies that it is essential for the forces to sustain a choice freedom amid all the existing options[14]. Transformational leaders are mainly guided by the moral guidelines that seek to establish the actual practice of certain roles. This practice is highly appropriate for the kind of leadership because the effectiveness of the adopted measures does not lie on the capability to barring conflict but mainly embracing the existence as a form of challenge.
Servant leading theory does not necessarily mean that the leader is being deprived the privileges of exceptionality[15]. However, it means being able to share the existing roles to the satisfaction of the followers as a form of motivating them. The Afghanistan forces development is mainly affected by the lack of adequate resources as well as the existence of a conflict. On this ground, the existing assumptions that it is impossible to create working forces in such a surrounding is not factual. This is because conflict is in most cases convincing as it offers a practical basis for skills building and knowledge acquisition among the members. The shifting political conflicts are appealing for the building because they galvanize and act as a source of motivation to those that are involved. The authority in transformational leadership is mainly acquired by the ability to identify dissatisfaction among the indigenous and western forces as they are required to work together and to mobilize them in achieving mutual aims.
Effective management is not based on the provision of the needed resources for capacity building as it is widely assumed. Management is a procedural practice that involves designing as well as maintaining a desirable surrounding where individuals operating in designed groups can successfully accomplish the set objectives[16]. This is a bureaucratic structure that mainly acquires its significance from the set strategic coordination as well as planning in the context of decisions development. Within the capacity building structures, it cannot be assumed that the strategic venture is to solve the existing issues without focusing on adhering to the developed procedures. Charismatic and shared leadership approaches are to be applied in such contexts to fully empower the existing staffs to support the achievements of goals in a shared structure. This allows the defense forces to collaborate in their working to expand their diverse operations provisions.
This approach is grounded on the idea of a decentralized system rather than the existing centralized ones within the defense organizations in order to develop an environment that is full of empowerment. The main benefits of following the approach are that they play part in gathering increased accountability and obligation for individuals to become more engaged in decision making. This theory also seeks to emphasize on high job satisfaction and an increased feeling of worthiness which are necessary for team working. The effective application of this approaches means changing the structures, the command chains that are more dependent on bureaucratic measures and relationships throughout the chain to ensure usefulness and effectiveness for every person. This is the rationale behind the existing challenge for effective execution of the intervention measures. There is a need to apply extreme dedication and commitment to the leadership lines. The practice best depicts attentiveness, accountability and influence in dealing with the existing hurdles.
The goal of management, leadership, and command is to offer assistance to others for them to achieve their premium roles and to maintain the realistic targets while overcoming operational hurdles[17]. In that, the leader should be creating some form of inspiration to the followers with an increased sensation of appeal and confidence equally to the charismatic leaders in order to motivate individuals in achieving the most desirable results. Thus, in order to stop the rising damaging deadly terrorist attacks in Afghanistan and offer adequate protection and guaranteed security nationally while decreasing the involved hurdles, the current command strategies should be rebuild in order to assert on transformation rather than bureaucratic leadership[18]. The indigenous forces have achieved little development if not zero post 2012 despite the commitment of the western forces[19]. The time that has been spent in the region best demonstrates that restraining the American forces and subjecting them to the sole role of counseling and training the troops as the means of capacity building has failed to generate any preferred result.
Ignoring to rejuvenate the indigenous forces has thus been a costly venture. Thus, instead of only focusing on the short run repairs for the existing resources and training needs the western forces along with the international community should mainly center their activities on establishing lasting resolutions while arranging reformation for the forces[20]. The bureaucratic leadership has offered those with the highest power the ability to misuse the existing resources for their individual gains which have made it even harder for the forces to make forward strides. This has not only played part in affecting performance but is also a major source of dissatisfaction among the soldiers. In order for the intervention to be a success, all the involved agencies ranging from the intelligence to the defense forces should all be engaged which will help in the building of comprehensive and well-equipped forces. The shifting political environment in Afghanistan has been harming the populace of the already struggling nation. In mitigating the risks and preventing further destructions and losses, the interventions for reform and capacity building should be a primary element of the new capacity building era for the nation. The western nations need to be an attentive, practical and tough force so that the vulnerabilities can be reduced and these measures would be essential in restructuring the forgotten forces. The American forces were withdrawn from Afghanistan in 2014 thus leaving the responsibility to the state department which is still struggling to recover from the damages acquired during the war period[21]. It is said by observers that the ongoing capacity building mission in the country is low and weak which in turn leads to poor performance. The capacity building program in Afghanistan was faced with notable challenges which can be overcome with attentiveness such as inadequate resources and poor coordination by the responsible leaders. The challenges were intensified by the fact that the environment was never safe.
In conclusion, for the international community and the western nations such as the United States, capacity building of the indigenous forces in the fragile nations remains a primary priority. With the increasing terrorist’s attacks, the ability to offer protection to the country’s populace as well as guaranteed security cannot be underrated. However, these interventions are usually characterized by unending challenges that normally affects the effectiveness of the intervention. As noted, it is obvious that capacity building does not necessarily involve the provision of resources and training rather effective leadership is a necessity as well. The bureaucratic command has affected the ability of the initiative due to increased dissatisfaction and corruption among the powerful leaders. In mitigating the existing challenges and risk, more viable management, leadership and command practices that adhere to offering inspiration to the forces is needed.
References
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[1] Biddle, Stephen. "Afghanistan's Legacy: Emerging Lessons of an Ongoing War." The Washington Quarterly 37, no. 2 (2014): 73-86.
[2] Dawoody, Alexander R. 2016. Eradicating Terrorism from the Middle East: Policy and Administrative Approaches.
[3] Jones, Bruce D., Shepard Forman, and Richard Gowan. 2010. Cooperating for peace and security: evolving institutions and arrangements in a context of changing U.S. security policy.
[4] Walter C. Ladwig III. The Forgotten Force: Police-Building in Iraq and Afghanistan. 2013.
[5] Wentzell, T. 2011. Security Force Capacity Building: Local Ownership versus Human Capital. Strategic and Operational Concerns.
[6] Mujaddidi F. Ghulam. 2017. Fixing Afghanistan's Struggling Security Forces
[7] Ali A. Jalali. 2006. Afghanistan National Defense and Security Forces. United states Institute of Peace.
[8] Hayes, Geoffrey. 2008. Afghanistan: transition under threat. Waterloo, ON: Wilfried Laurier Univ. Press.
[9]Hayes, Geoffrey. 2008. Afghanistan: transition under threat. Waterloo, ON: Wilfried Laurier Univ. Press.
[10] Burns, James MacGregor. 2004. Transforming leadership: the new pursuit of happiness.
[11] Hays, Martin, and Christopher Kim. 2012. Transforming leadership for the 21st century
[12] Hays, Martin, and Christopher Kim. 2012. Transforming leadership for the 21st century
[13] Burns, James MacGregor. 2004. Transforming leadership: the new pursuit of happiness.
[14] Hayes, Geoffrey. 2008. Afghanistan: transition under threat. Waterloo, ON: Wilfried Laurier Univ. Press.
[15] Burns, James MacGregor. 2004. Transforming leadership: the new pursuit of happiness.
[16] Hays, Martin, and Christopher Kim. 2012. Transforming leadership for the 21st century
[17] Burns, James MacGregor. 2004. Transforming leadership: the new pursuit of happiness.
[18] Gürbüz, Uğur, and Press IOS. 2013. Capacity Building in the Fight against Terrorism. Amsterdam: IOS Press
[19] Hayes, Geoffrey. 2008. Afghanistan: transition under threat. Waterloo, ON: Wilfried Laurier Univ. Press.
[20] Nader, Alireza. 2014. Iran's Influence in Afghanistan: Implications for the U.S. Drawdown. Santa Monica, California: RAND Corporation
[21] Jones, Seth G., Arturo Muñoz, (U.S.) National Defense Research Institute, and States United. 2010. Afghanistan's Local War: Building Local Defense Forces. Santa Monica, CA: RAND Corporation
